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NATURE OF THE ACTION -

STATUTE OF LIMITA-

Plaintiff brought an action to recover damages occasioned by certain
letters, alleged to be false and malicious, written by the defendant of and concerning the title to plaintiff's property. Since the letters were written more than
one year prior to the commencement of the action, defendant argued that the
action was barred by a clause in the local statute of limitations providing that
"actions for libel and slander shall be commenced within one year after the
cause of action shall have accrued." 1 On the other hand the plaintiff asserted
that the case came under the statute's two-year limitation of actions for "injury
to the •.• rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein especially
enumerated.•.•" 2 Held, that the limitation as to commencement of actions
for libel and slander applies whether the slander involves property or person.
Woodard v. Pacific Fruit & Produce Co., (Ore. 1940) 106 P. (2d) 1043.
The owner of an estate or interest in any real or personal property has a
TIONS -

Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. ( 1940), § 1-207 ( 2).
l Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940), § 1-206 (1). The statute of 21 James I, c.
16 (1623), on which most modern statutes of limitation are based, provided that
all actions on the case for torts, other than slander, must be brought within six years.
1 l
2

RECENT DECISIONS
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cause of action against one who maliciously denies or impugns his title thereto
if he thereby suffers damages. 3 Originally the term "slander" was applied only
to words or utterances the nature of which was defamatory to the reputation of
an individual. 4 At common law an action for slander of title was not properly
brought as an action for libel or slander but rather as an action on the case for
damages wilfully done without just occasion or excuse. G The use of the term
"slander" was soon extended, however, to cover words, oral or written, disparaging another's title to property,° and thereby to include two actions which
in fact were essentially different. By resort to a fiction personifying title, certain
of the rules for slander and libel were applied to slander of title.7 Injury to the
reputation of a person is of the essence of defamation. Whether a speech or
writing is slander of title or defamation depends on whether it goes to disparage
the title of a thing or the reputation of a person. 8 Whether a particular case is
held to be defamation or slander of title will make a great difference in the
rules applied thereto by the court. 9 Thus it is clear that the two concepts are not
identical.10 There is, however, an apparently fundamental similarity between
the two and it is this feature that has confused the courts. In all these cases the
law is protecting the plaintiff against loss resulting from words of the defendant
spoken or written to third parties. It can also be argued that there must be
actual pecuniary damage to the plaintiff in all cases and that where the law
makes libel and certain kinds of slander actionable per se it is conclusively
presuming actual damage.11 Taking this view, it would seem that slander of
title is merely slander or libel applied to a slightly different fact situation. However, it is evident that the courts have been continually movin-g toward the protection of reputation as such and the giving of damages for injury thereto
regardless of actual pecuniary loss.12 Thus, while the two actions were once
quite similar in theory though different in practice, they are slowly becoming
8
Hill v. Ward, 13 Ala. 310 (1848). "Liability is imposed on one who (a) communicates to a third person (b) statements disparaging the plaintiff's title, (c) which
are not true in fact, and ( d) which cause the plaintiff actual damage." HARPER, ToRTS,
§ 274 (1933). See also Hanson v. Hall Mfg. Co., 194 Iowa 1213, 197 N. W. 967
(1922); Kelly v. First State Bank of Rothsay, 145 Minn. 331, 177 N. W. 347
(1920).
4 Lyman v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 286 Mass. 258, 190 N. E.
542 (1934); Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, 262 N. Y. 99, 186 N. E.
217 (1933).
G Ratcliffe v. Evans, [1892] 2 Q. B. 524; Malachy v. Soper, 3 Bing. N. C.
371, 132 Eng. Rep. 453 (1836).
6
Potosi Zinc Co. v. Mahoney, 36 Nev. 390, 135 P. 1078 (1913); Pickens v.
Hal J. Copeland Grocery Co., 219 Ala. 697, 123 So. 223 (1929).
1 Wilson v. Dubois, 35 Minn. 471, 29 N. W. 68 (1886).
8
Holmes v. Clisby, 118 Ga. 820, 45 S. E. 684 (1903); Lynotype Co. v. British
Empire Type-setting Machine Co., 81 L. T. 331, 15 T. L. R. 524 (1899).
9
3 ToRTs RESTATEMENT 323, introductory note (1938).
10
BoWER, AcTIONABLE DEFAMATION, 2d ed., 209 (1923).
11
ToWNSHEND, SLANDER AND LIBEL, 3d ed., c. 4 (1877), and authorities therein
cited. And see note in 38 M1cH. L. REv. 253 (1939).
12
Pound, "Interests of Personality," 28 HARv. L. REv. 343, 445 (1915).
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different in theory as well. On this basis the words "slander and libel" would
certainly not include actions for slander of title. It is submitted, however, that
the mistake of so including them is of no mqre than academic interest so far as
the statute of limitations is concerned. The considerations involved in setting
a limit on the time for the bringing of these actions would be the same in both
cases and thus the statutory period should be the same.18

Herbert R. Whiting

18 The courts seem to approach the problem from the point of view that there
is no reason for limiting the words of the statute "actions in slander and libel" to
words defamatory of persons only. McDonald v. Green, 176 Mass. l 13, 57 N. E. 21 l
(1900); Buehrer v. Provident Mutual Life Ins. Co., IZ3 Ohio St. 264, 175 N. E.
25 (1931); Carroll v. Warner Bros. Pictures, (D. C. N. Y. 1937) 20 F. Supp. 405;
and principal case. Also see Chesebro v. Powers, 78 Mich. 472, 44 N. W. 290 (1889);
Bush v. McMann, 12 Colo. App. 504, 55 P. 956 (1899). And compare the two
Illinois cases, Jones v. Barrom, 217 Ill. 381, 75 N. E. 505 (1905), and Reliable
Mfg. Co. v. Vaughan Novelty Mfg. Co., 294 Ill. App. 601, 13 N. E. (2d) 518
(1938).

